The Inference Report

Historical social simulation faces a fundamental reproducibility challenge: the stochastic nature of large language models (LLMs) introduces a digital butterfly effect that prevents exact replication across multi-turn runs. Furthermore, the inability to control low-level server parameters in commercial LLM hosting environments severely limits reproducibility. To overcome this opacity, we present a deterministic multi-agent framework coupling LLMs to an Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) pipeline grounded in Theory of Mind (ToM) and Cognitive Archaeology, and validate exact artifact identity within local, pinned execution environments using SHA-256 hashing. Run locally at temperature zero with clean per-call model reloads, the system injects differentiated cognitive states per turn through dissonance-driven behavioural modes and gated internal voices. Evaluating seven model configurations spanning 4B to 31B parameters against an ablated baseline reveals clear operational boundaries. Small models ($\leq$8B) suffer from context capacity overload, producing repetitive, specular dialogue loops. However, at $\geq$12B parameters, the ABM scaffolding breaks the monotonous response patterns seen in ablation. Crucially, these scaffolded models exhibit spontaneous diegetic expansion: they coherently expand scenario lore through tactically motivated, anachronism-free details rather than escalating into aggression. By resisting the structural pull toward premature scene closure, scaffolded sessions sustain an open terminal Narrative Vector ($V_N = \mathrm{Open}$ in 12/21 overall; 9/9 in official $\geq$12B configurations) whereas unscaffolded ablation never does (0/21). This framework provides a transparent, auditable benchmark architecture for virtual archaeology, with the full pipeline released as open-source software to enable independent replication.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly operate in groups, each pursuing an individual objective while jointly determining system performance. If an operator controls which agent observes which other agent, but not their payoffs or messages, how should observations be structured to raise collective welfare? We make the information network (who observes whom) a design object, decoupled from the fixed interaction network over which agents act. Ten identical LLM agents play repeated group-decision games; by default each observes only an anonymous summary of the group's previous-round outcome, and a manager with a fixed budget adds directed observation links that reveal peers' past actions. Across 1,080 episodes and six games spanning coordination, anti-coordination, social dilemmas, and discovery, we ask how much information to share and, at a fixed budget, who should observe whom. Disclosure creates behavioral coupling: observation acts as a contagion channel whose welfare effect depends on the alignment between individually attractive behavior and the collective objective. First, the value of information is alignment-contingent: more peer information tends to help or be neutral when individual behavior is aligned with the collective goal, but under free-riding or congestion externalities it amplifies collectively harmful behavior; in a public-goods game the group does best with no information at all. We read this sign separation as a cross-game regularity within one controlled LLM population, not a model-invariant law. Second, at a fixed budget, who observes whom matters primarily when coupling is harmful: a modular "barbell" that lets sub-populations entrench harmful behavior is reliably the worst wiring, reversing the network-reciprocity intuition from human evolutionary game theory. These results argue against a default of full transparency for agent collectives.

Cryptocurrency markets provide a natural testbed for autonomous AI agents because they are digital-native, high-frequency, and machine-speed environments, yet existing methods often struggle with non-stationary market regimes, opaque decisions, and fixed aggregation rules. In this paper, we propose Agent4Crypto, a dual-reflective and market-feedback-aligned multi-agent system. The framework coordinates specialized agents for data collection, analysis, risk assessment, reflection, and trading, synthesizing heterogeneous signals from prices, indicators, news, and charts in an interpretable decision pipeline. Our central design is a trader-centric decision mechanism: three style-specific trader agents, Aggressive, Neutral, and Conservative, generate candidate actions and natural-language rationales from the same market context, while their influence is learned rather than manually fixed. A PPO-based gating policy dynamically allocates trader weights through a dual-reflective feedback process. One reflection stream evaluates post-trade decision quality from realized portfolio outcomes and distills reusable lessons into a Financial ReasoningBank for retrieval in subsequent trader prompts, while the other estimates trader-level counterfactual contribution, indicating which style has recently aligned better with market movements. The PPO state combines Counterfactual Contribution Memory with market features, previous trader weights, and current trader actions, so trader influence adapts across bull, sideways, and bear regimes. Experiments on BTC, ETH, and XRP show that Agent4Crypto improves total return and Sharpe ratio over traditional strategies, machine learning and reinforcement learning baselines, and existing LLM-based trading systems, demonstrating the value of interpretable trader competition and market-feedback-driven adaptation in volatile cryptocurrency markets.

Coordination between large language-model agents has become a central question for AI safety and software engineering, as such agents are deployed in groups that share infrastructure. Existing research tells the agents that partners exist or asks them to coordinate. Whether coordination arises through shared state alone, with nothing disclosing that anyone else is present, is the key question for deployments that share caches and memory between agents, yet it has rarely been examined, and never with independent replication; this study does both. Four agents each received a short arithmetic task and a key-value store presented to each as its own scratch space; two held complementary halves of one computation, and no prompt mentioned other agents, sharing or collaboration. For reliability, the environment was rebuilt independently from a written protocol, and both implementations ran under hashed locks on design, data and analysis. The results bear novelty value in three respects. Joint success occurred only through the shared store. Whether a model coordinated depended not on its vendor tier but on whether it wrote its intermediate result and looked at the store again, and one ordinary sentence, "check your workspace again before submitting", switched that second look on and off. The findings held under replication. For practice, state shared between agents is a communication channel and should be separated, namespaced and logged. For research, designs should be locked before the data, and the parse rule, endpoint and parameters reported. Future work should test open-weight models and separate using another agent's output from intending to communicate.

When AI agents screen items for a costly human assessor, as in agentic search, e-discovery and AI reviewing of papers, only what they pass gets judged. We show what each kind of evidence can establish about their errors, even with unlimited data. Agreement shows that agents concur, not that they are right, however many there are. Acceptance by the assessor gives precision but only a lower bound on recall. Knowing which agents found which relevant items gives an upper bound on recall if agents' finds are not negatively correlated, and caps what one more agent can add if agents are interchangeable. Without assumptions about the agents, recall can be pinned down only by judging items they did not pass: a random sample of these estimates how many relevant items were missed, to any chosen accuracy, and the sample needed does not grow with the number of agents.

Teams increasingly build software from cooperating large language model (LLM) agents, often assuming more agents mean more reliability. Yet the usual evidence, average benchmark accuracy, ignores the input mix a deployed system meets and the rule merging the agents' answers. Building on HIP-LLM, a hierarchical imprecise-probability assessment of single LLMs, we propose a framework combining it with a Bayesian network of the system's failure logic for multi-agent systems. Agent failure-probability intervals propagate through this network, where the combining rule can itself fail, into a reliability envelope showing which evidence limits it. In a pipeline extracting regulated chemical-hazard statements, majority voting over three models protected against the weakest but did not clearly exceed the best, and a voter failing on 5\% of demands would largely erase its advantage over the middle model. More agents yield a more defensible reliability claim, not automatically a more reliable system.