The Inference Report

Decision Models (DMs), a new class of AI models, give fast responses and return a probability distribution over a fixed set of options. These properties make them candidate human surrogates in economic simulations and surveys, a role increasingly filled by Large Language Models (LLMs), which are costly at scale and under-represent the variation in human behaviour. We present a first evaluation of DMs as human surrogates in economics, comparing 10 DMs with 8 LLMs in three economic settings: a household spending survey on consumption, several classic economic games and a labour-market field experiment. Frontier DMs, those that score highest on general decision-making benchmarks, reproduce the variation in human responses more closely than LLMs in all three settings. They capture the modal human response as well as LLMs in the spending survey, but less well in the economic games. Frontier DMs are also roughly ten times faster than the fastest LLM and can be over a hundred times cheaper. Together, these results suggest that DMs capture the heterogeneity of human behaviour better than LLMs and make large-scale economic simulations more feasible.

Defenders and attackers race to find the same software flaws. I use the launch of Project Glasswing, which gave a small group of large US tech firms early access to Claude Mythos Preview, a model for finding software vulnerabilities, to study how access to frontier AI affects defenders, external researchers, and attackers. Using the universe of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities, I find that firms with access more than doubled their disclosures relative to Chinese and Russian tech firms without access, disclosed about 150 percent more high-impact vulnerabilities, and fixed reported flaws as quickly as before. As treated firms found more flaws themselves, external researchers, who sell their findings through bug bounties, reported about half as many vulnerabilities in treated firms' code and more in other firms' code, without leaving the market. There is no evidence that attackers exploited the additional vulnerabilities: the share exploited within a month of disclosure fell by about two thirds, mainly because a smaller share was already exploited when disclosed, while the number exploited did not change. Frontier AI helped defenders find and fix more flaws before attackers exploited them, but its restricted release creates an asymmetry in software security between firms in different countries.

35.2% of task time in world employment is at least partly delegable to AI agents in 2026, and only 2.5% can be handed over in full. Existing measures score exposure to generative AI, mostly for the United States. We build the Agent Delegability Index (ADI): two language models rate all 18,796 O*NET 30.2 task statements on a frozen, preregistered rubric of delegation levels and barriers; tasks are mapped to 433 ISCO-08 unit groups and weighted by ILOSTAT employment in 146 countries. Four findings. First, delegable employment rises with income, from 22.5% in low-income to 48.7% in high-income countries, a slope of 7.23 percentage points per log point of GDP per capita. This delegation divide is compositional: the physical barrier dominates the jobs poorer countries employ most. Second, at the occupation level ADI tracks exposure closely (r = 0.93 with Eloundou et al. and 0.89 with Felten et al.), above the preregistered bound of 0.80; ADI adds delegation levels and barriers on top of exposure, for the world, not a new ranking of occupations. Third, full delegation is rare and peaks for tasks that take a human about twelve minutes (11.8 minutes). Fourth, the preregistered adoption gap is not supported: across 101 countries, delegability and observed AI usage correlate at r = 0.86, and the gap between them is not wider in middle-income countries (p = 0.27). Model agreement is kappa = 0.77; a blind human rating of 300 tasks agrees with the model consensus at kappa = 0.85, and an agentic panel with web search at kappa = 0.87. We release the index, the atlas, the prompts and an MCP server at https://github.com/Cespial/delegation-divide.

Research on why people contribute to open source software (OSS) and related open collaboration platforms spans more than two decades, but its findings conflict, and studies often treat the work people contribute and their intention to keep contributing as interchangeable. Drawing on self-determination theory and motivation crowding theory, we meta-analyze 41 studies. The main analysis pools 178 correlations of eight antecedents with contribution effort and continuance intention from 29 independent samples (N = 9,632). Seven antecedents relate positively to effort, all eight relate positively to intention, and each relates at least as strongly to intention as to effort. Contrary to a common assumption, intrinsic motivation is not more strongly related to effort than extrinsic motivation, but its gap between intention and effort is larger. Reputation relates to effort mainly on platforms with a reputation system, and we find no sign that monetary rewards crowd out enjoyment. The findings inform how platforms can turn contributors' intentions into work.

Changes in occupational task content may have different economic implications depending on whether the tasks gained or lost are occupation-specific or already widespread across the economy. Existing measures of occupational task change largely abstract from this distinction, treating occupations as self-contained task bundles rather than accounting for how tasks are distributed across occupations. We develop a framework to measure a distinct dimension of occupational change, one that goes beyond task expertise or task content: task structure. Using this new framework that tracks tasks across occupations and over time, we separate changes in task quantity from changes in occupational uniqueness, defined as the distinctiveness of an occupation's task bundle relative to other occupations. Using a harmonized dataset of 196563 task statements from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and O*NET spanning 1977-2018, we measure task diffusion, occupational uniqueness, and distinct dimensions of task addition and removal. Occupations that become less unique are also associated with lower wage growth, and the wage associations of task additions and removals depend on how widely the affected tasks are performed elsewhere. Adding highly diffused tasks is associated with lower wage growth, as is removing occupation-specific tasks. At the economy-wide dimension, however, the pattern differs: the addition of new tasks is positively associated with wage growth, whereas the removal of tasks is negatively associated with it. Taken together, these results show that similar changes in the number of tasks performed by an occupation can reflect economically distinct processes. Incorporating the cross-occupational distribution of tasks, therefore, provides a richer account of occupational change and its relationship to the wage structure.

Population prompts are widely used to generate synthetic survey responses, but they combine information supplied at inference with associations already encoded during pretraining. We introduce an alternative construction that maps declared aggregate preference anchors into group-indexed choice policies. For each population, the signs of six Global Preferences Survey (GPS) coordinates deterministically label a shared bank of paired synthetic responses, and Direct Preference Optimization fits a parameter-efficient adapter to those comparisons. We evaluate the adapters on candidate World Values Survey (WVS) items using prompts that omit country names and distinguish four questions: recovery of the imposed labels, transfer of the anchor signal to new text, coherence between the GPS anchors and human WVS responses, and agreement between adapter and human scores. The adapters recover the imposed pairwise labels. On a purposively selected sixteen-country development panel, adapter trust scores completely separate the two GPS-sign groups and have a rank correlation of (0.74) with continuous GPS trust scores. Human-GPS and adapter-human associations remain unresolved on the same panel, and results for the other preference dimensions are heterogeneous. These findings show that an anchored policy can retain a declared aggregate signal without thereby reproducing human response patterns. The contribution is therefore both an inspectable construction and an evaluation framework that separates anchor transfer from human criterion agreement.

LLMs increasingly act as purchasing agents, which makes the LLM, not the user, the one choosing among the options that satisfy a request; its preferences quietly fix what gets bought and what it costs. Hotel booking is a clean instance: a high-volume choice settled on a few comparable attributes, where the pick reveals those preferences. We introduce PriceBench, a diagnostic benchmark that recovers an LLM's price, quality, and brand preferences from its booking choices with a logit choice model, applied to 28 LLMs from 8 providers on 3,600 hotel tasks from 179 real New York City properties. We find that capability is associated with how consistently an LLM chooses, not with what it chooses: more capable LLMs hold stronger, more consistent preferences, while weaker ones either lock onto one position, exploitable by whoever controls listing order, or choose almost indifferently. What those preferences favor varies sharply across providers and even within one family: price sensitivity spans more than an order of magnitude, and the price/quality trade-off moves mean booked nightly price from \$247 to \$393 on identical tasks. What an agent buys must therefore be measured per LLM, not inferred, and we release the tasks, code, and all 28 response sets.

Consumers increasingly delegate purchasing decisions to Large Language Models (LLMs) acting as surrogate consumers. Using "Tool-Lab," an adaptation of information-board process tracing that places product attributes behind costly tool calls, we examine how marketing pricing cues (i.e., just-below pricing and promotional framing) influence AI shopping agents. Across eight commercially deployed LLMs from three providers, we trace pre-choice information acquisition. Under zero cost, pricing cues rarely mislead. Imposing acquisition costs under a vague goal prompt leads LLMs to omit diagnostic attributes required to compute unit price and choose suboptimal choices resembling human heuristics. Relative to a specific goal prompt that mainly preserves diagnostic search and choice optimality, a vague goal prompt under constraints creates a search-mediated vulnerability. This research demonstrates that marketing heuristics in delegated AI shopping are governed by storefront information architecture, not necessarily immutable LLM flaws.

Large language models (LLMs) now serve as conversational shopping assistants on platforms that also sell advertising. These AI agents face a conflict of duty. They advise consumers who rely on their judgment, yet are deployed by platforms that benefit when sponsored listings are chosen. Sponsorship disclosures, designed to allow consumers to penalize paid placements, now reach the AI agent rather than the consumer, and the agent's evaluation of them is hidden from the consumer. Drawing on the fiduciary concept of conflict of duty, we argue that an agent's evaluation of a sponsored listing should not depend on which party deployed it. In controlled choice experiments, we manipulate assigned roles in the system prompt to name either a traveler or a booking platform as the agent's principal. Platform delegation significantly attenuates the penalty that agents apply to sponsored listings and weakens the skepticism that disclosure triggers in their reasoning traces. We replicate out findings across LLMs and reasoning depths. A second study decomposes the disclosure label and shows that the divergence between the two delegates widens significantly when the paid placement is attributed to the platform. Stricter terminology ("Sponsored" instead of "Promoted") lowers choice of paid listings but does not close this gap when the platform is named. The findings show that disclosure mandates designed for human consumers cannot by themselves protect consumers in AI-mediated commerce.

Discrete choice model specification is a time-consuming task in which modellers often specify and estimate multiple models while balancing goodness-of-fit, parsimony, and behavioural plausibility. We present Delphos, a multitask reinforcement learning framework that learns transferable specification strategies across transport choice datasets. Delphos frames model specification as a sequential decision-making problem in which it applies a sequence of modelling actions and receives feedback from an estimation environment based on model performance and convergence. To transfer modelling decisions across datasets with different sets of variables, Delphos represents utility specifications as sets of modelling terms using a DeepSet-Q architecture, allowing a shared specification policy to learn across multiple datasets. Trained on nine transport choice datasets, Delphos consistently outperforms independently trained single-task agents, indicating that sharing modelling experience improves learning efficiency and helps identify promising sequences of modelling decisions with fewer unsuccessful estimation attempts. When applied without further training to the unseen Swissmetro and Decisions datasets, the same agent identifies competitive specifications in less than 20 minutes on a standard CPU. It achieves a higher log-likelihood per observation than the VNS metaheuristic on Swissmetro and performance comparable to a published MNL specification developed by expert modellers on Decisions. These findings show that accumulating and reusing modelling experience enables Delphos to function as an intelligent assistant for discrete choice model specification. It reduces manual trial-and-error while allowing modellers to retain control over model diagnosis, refinement, and final selection.

People increasingly use language models to support life decisions. Many such decisions involve a probabilistic forecast: How likely is a major life event, a natural disaster, or an economic outcome? Users of language models may implicitly trust that these forecasts fall out of a coherent world model. In this paper, we evaluate the coherence of language model probabilistic forecasts through a procedure that builds on a theorem due to de Finetti. We elicit forecasts from language models across events generated from stock returns data. We then use linear programs to compute the largest Dutch-book profit - the profit an arbitrageur could guarantee by betting against model-generated probabilities - which we use as a measure of incoherence. Our procedure does not require outcome labels, so we can evaluate coherence even in settings where outcomes are not observed or have not yet resolved. We find substantial evidence of incoherence in language model forecasts. Such incoherence increases when there are richer logical relationships between events, and irrelevant contextual details can increase incoherence by an order of magnitude. We conclude by discussing how alternative training strategies may improve probabilistic coherence.

Posted prices for AI inference have fallen steadily since 2024, yet the measured speed of that fall depends almost entirely on the method of measurement. This paper constructs quality-adjusted price indices for the AI inference market from public data. The panel assembles 21,024 posted-price observations across 3,208 models and 86 providers and joins them to 4,605 benchmark scores through a latent quality index estimated from benchmark response patterns, so the quality ladder of the hedonic tradition is built here from evaluations in place of product characteristics. Measured by the matched-model methods that statistical agencies apply to software, inference prices fell at 0.10 log points a year. The quality-adjusted index fell at 0.73, so 87% of the decline is invisible to current methods, with direct consequences for measured competition, concentration and productivity in this market. Counted per completed task, moreover, the buyer's price stopped falling. Reasoning models raised token consumption faster than token prices fell, and the seller's and buyer's prices accordingly diverged. A pre-registered validity audit disciplines the quality measure and yields the sharpest result. Excluding contamination-flagged benchmarks leaves model rankings intact at 0.998 yet moves the index by 0.49 log points a year, so the leaderboard-stability arguments standard in AI evaluation offer no defence of economic statistics built on benchmarks. Prices, quality and the audit are fully reproducible from public sources at zero cost.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming measurement in economics. AI models convert unstructured data, such as text and images, into structured variables at low cost, making previously prohibitive measurement feasible at scale. This shifts the bottleneck from finding any scalable measure of a phenomenon to choosing among many plausible ones, which may support different empirical conclusions. This review provides guidance for navigating that shift. We describe three stages at which AI enters the measurement pipeline---discovery, construct definition, and observation---and what each demands of researchers. We argue that credible inference with AI-generated variables requires appropriately designed validation: anchoring measurement to explicit criteria, rather than informal claims that a proxy is reasonable. We then examine how validation samples support valid inference even when AI predictions are arbitrarily biased, and what can be done when a random validation sample is unavailable.

We study how organizations use frontier generative AI by linking ChatGPT Enterprise account records to usage, worker roles, task classifications, and public-company financial data through March 2026. These linked data enable a privacy-preserving analysis of adoption, worker roles, and message-level tasks at scale: for instance, the worker-level sample we analyze at the six-month adoption horizon includes over 1,500 organizations and over 17 million messages. We document four facts about enterprise AI adoption and use. First, ChatGPT Enterprise usage has grown rapidly due to a combination of new firm adoption and growing intensity among existing adopters. Second, U.S.-based public company adoption is concentrated among larger, more valuable, and more R&D- and SG&A-intensive firms. Third, active use within adopting firms spans job functions and seniority levels, with especially high usage intensity among early-career workers. Fourth, ChatGPT Enterprise usage encompasses a broad range of knowledge work tasks, including writing, technical work, communication, and information synthesis. In aggregate, these results suggest that firms differ widely in the speed, breadth and purpose of their enterprise AI adoption, and that they are still actively learning how to integrate AI into organizational workflows.

This paper documents an applied natural-language-processing framework for measuring the tone of Brazilian Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) statements. The project is explicitly inspired by iSent, Itaú's Central Bank sentiment classifier, particularly its sentence-level division of official communication into hawkish, dovish, neutral, and out-of-context classes. The implementation extends that idea in three directions. First, an LLM identifies short hawkish and dovish expressions and assigns each a 0-to-1 intensity weight. Second, the document index combines sentence counts with document-specific average signal intensities, producing a bounded score from -1 to 1. Third, a separate full-document layer measures forward-guidance direction, guidance explicitness, uncertainty level, and change in uncertainty. The empirical sample is restricted to communications dated August 2016 or later and contains 80 statements and 1,498 classified sentences from August 31, 2016 through August 5, 2026. Across this sample, 33.3% of sentences are hawkish, 18.0% dovish, 42.1% neutral, and 6.5% out of context. The average document score is +0.107, while the most hawkish reading is +0.570 in August 2021. The latest statement, dated August 5, 2026, scores +0.232, with eight hawkish, two dovish, and nine neutral sentences. Its structural overlay is more nuanced: guidance is directionally ambiguous but partly explicit, while uncertainty is classified as central and higher than at the prior meeting. Tone and the guidance-direction score have a contemporaneous Pearson correlation of 0.719. These are descriptive outputs, not a validated forecast of Selic decisions or DI returns. The main contribution is therefore methodological: a transparent, incremental, auditable system that separates rhetorical tone from policy guidance and uncertainty.

Social media affect financial markets, but public posts by financial media personas are voluntary disclosures. What is not disclosed is therefore usually unobserved. We address this measurement problem by conducting repeated, real-time interviews of "digital twins" built from monitored finfluencers' X accounts under a fixed protocol. The interviews recover stock-level public-persona belief proxies even when no public recommendation is made. Because the interviews are generated and archived before the relevant return windows, the design avoids the look-ahead bias that arises when LLMs are queried ex post. The evidence shows that information obtained from these digital-twin interviews predicts the cross section of large-cap stock returns in the expected direction. Repeated real-time interviews therefore show how selective disclosure can be turned into measurable panels of market views.

Researchers, managers and policymakers are exploring different approaches and data sources to map the development and the diffusion of Artificial Intelligence (AI). In this research note, we illustrate the opportunities offered by trademark data. We argue that AI trademarks can complement AI patents to capture different dimensions of AI innovation. AI trademarks can reveal the extent and ways in which companies exploit AI technologies to develop new goods and services. Importantly, trademark data offer a timely and globally available data source that covers all economic sectors. We present insights from using AI trademarks in an empirical exploration of Italian firms. In our discussion, we reflect on how AI trademarks can be used at different levels of analysis to tackle emerging questions about the development and diffusion of AI.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly transforming economies, societies, and polities, raising fundamental questions about how it should be regulated. Policymakers face choices over whether to prioritize innovation or safety, rely on public oversight or private self-regulation, and govern nationally or internationally. Yet little is known about how citizens evaluate these competing priorities. Here we report a conjoint survey experiment conducted in seven countries with diverse political and economic profiles. We find that citizens strongly support regulating AI and generally prioritize safety over innovation, public governance over private self-regulation, and international over national approaches. The preference for safety is strongest among those who perceive AI as risky, unpredictable, and personally consequential. These findings reveal a systematic misalignment between dominant regulatory approaches and citizen preferences.

Probably not, at least for meta-analyses in economics. In a pre-registered, identity-masked, within-paper experiment, the authors of 44 meta-analyses ranked three AI reports on their own paper by usefulness for improving it: a single pass by a frontier model against two multi-agent debate tools we built and expected to win. All reports were held to a common length and template. The authors preferred the single pass, by 0.66 rank points over mad-research (95% CI 0.32 to 1.00) and 0.57 over paper-workshop (0.16 to 0.95), though paper-workshop spent roughly thirty times the tokens. Authors who recalled their journal referee report usually placed it first and never last; in a separate exercise, three AI judges almost always placed the real journal referee report last. Among the three AI reports, Gemini (the judge whose model family wrote none of the reports) would have ranked paper-workshop first in the authors' place, reversing the single-pass preference. The reversal warns against substituting an AI judge for the author. We measure perceived usefulness for finished papers; whether AI should referee papers is a separate question.

We analyze how four forces restructure the AI industry over 2026-2030: the DRAM/HBM price surge, frontier-capable open-weight models (GLM-5.2), rapid inference-efficiency gains (near-Shannon-limit KV-cache compression, lightweight local runtimes), and the entry of Meta and xAI into compute resale on fleets bought before the memory repricing. Formulating inference economics in dollars per petabyte of bandwidth delivered (\$/PB) -- model-agnostic for bandwidth-bound decode -- we show the entrant-incumbent cost gap never closes: a depreciation conveyor delivers newly amortized fleets to incumbents faster than hardware prices normalize (3.2x in 2026, 1.9x in 2027, re-widening to 3-4x by 2029-30). Training bifurcates into a luxury tier (\$18-38B per frontier run by 2030) and a mass tier (previous-frontier parity via RL/distillation falling toward \$5M). Solvency of the announced buildout is confined to a corridor requiring roughly 2x annual token-demand growth for four years with sticky premium pricing; a measurement critique shows public token trackers overstate monetizable demand, and all pre-Q2-2026 projections predate the industry's shift from token maximization to token minimization. A vintage-breakeven analysis finds 2026 and 2028-29 capacity each fatally exposed to one pricing regime, with only the 2027 vintage robust. A greenfield custom-silicon entrant removes the merchant margin but not the memory premium (central outcome: 25% success/34% mediocre/41% loss, improvable via staged go/no-go gates). China's LineShine LX2 -- domestic HBM on a standard ISA -- decouples its cost curve from the memory crisis. Scenario probabilities: Rotating Landlord Oligopoly 25%, Commoditization Crash 25%, Jevons Absorption 20%, System-Layer Re-differentiation 18%, Geopolitical Bifurcation 12%. Solvency now depends on monetized bandwidth demand, premium stickiness, and vintage ownership.

We propose a model-grounded RAG-based AI economist with an agentic framework for economic scenario analysis using large language models (LLMs) and knowledge graphs. While LLMs can generate fluent economic narratives, economists are often required to make economic claims grounded by economic theory and real-world data. Based on this motivation, this study proposes an RAG-based AI economist, which utilizes knowledge graphs including economic data and theory and LLM-based agents to plan the analysis, retrieve relevant evidence, select appropriate models, and generate reports. In our framework, we do not produce quantitative claims directly with the language model alone; instead, we generate narratives grounded in explicit model-based computations and linked to the retrieved evidence via AI agents. We refer to our framework as an AI economist agent. We evaluate the AI economist agent in two applications: economist report generation for U.S. inflation persistence and Federal Reserve policy, and bank stress-test narrative generation for U.S. commercial real estate refinancing stress. The results illustrate how grounding the generated reports improves their economic coherence and traceability.

Can artificial intelligence (AI) refute economic theory? I document experiments in which I asked several AI models (Gemini, Refine, Claude, and ChatGPT) to check the correctness of four published papers in economic theory, each containing an error that I helped identify or correct. ChatGPT Pro performed best, occasionally constructing counterexamples and corrected proofs, while other models fared worse. However, no model located a true error without substantial human guidance, and data contamination complicates interpretation. I argue that a competent human paired with a frontier model can outperform current peer review, but AI cannot yet refute economic theory on its own.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has spurred economists to study how humans and LLMs behave in strategic settings. We organized a series of round-robin tournaments in the Colonel Blotto game. This game attracts game theorists' attention due to high-dimensional action space and the absence of pure strategy Nash equilibria. In the first tournament, more than 200 human participants competed against one another. In the second tournament, several popular LLMs were invited to submit strategies. In the third tournament, we matched the number of LLM strategies to the number submitted by humans. We find that humans more often employ better-calibrated intermediate-level allocation heuristics and outperform the simpler, more stereotyped strategies submitted by LLMs. Strategic sophistication is key to success if and only if the necessary level of reasoning depth is reached, while lower and higher levels of reasoning offer no clear advantage over the primitive strategies. Among humans, field of study weakly predicts success: participants with STEM backgrounds perform better in the first tournament. Surprisingly, humans almost do not adjust their strategies across tournaments with different sets of opponents. This result suggests that humans base their choices primarily on the game's rules rather than on the identity of their opponents, treating LLMs much like human competitors.

AI agents powered by large language models are increasingly acting on behalf of humans in social and economic environments. Prior research has focused on their task performance and effects on human outcomes, but less is known about the relationship between agents and the specific individuals who deploy them. We ask whether agents systematically reflect the behavioral characteristics of their human owners, functioning as behavioral extensions rather than producing generic outputs. We study this question using 10,659 matched human-agent pairs from Moltbook, a social media platform where each autonomous agent is publicly linked to its owner's Twitter/X account. By comparing agents' posts on Moltbook with their owners' Twitter/X activity across features spanning topics, values, affect, and linguistic style, we find systematic transfer between agents and their specific owners. This transfer persists among agents without explicit configuration, and pairs that align on one behavioral dimension tend to align on others. These patterns are consistent with transfer emerging through accumulated interaction between owners (or owners' computer environments) and their agents in everyday use. We further show that agents with stronger behavioral transfer are more likely to disclose owner-related personal information in public discourse, suggesting that the same owner-specific context that drives behavioral transfer may also create privacy risk during ordinary use. Taken together, our results indicate that AI agents do not simply generate content, but reflect owner-related context in ways that can propagate human behavioral heterogeneity into digital environments, with implications for privacy, platform design, and the governance of agentic systems.

Can Large Language Models (AI agents) aggregate dispersed private information through trading and reason about the knowledge of others by observing price movements? We conduct a controlled experiment where AI agents trade in a prediction market after receiving private signals, measuring information aggregation by the log error of the last price. We find that although the median market is effective at aggregating information in the easy information structures, increasing the complexity has a significant and negative impact, suggesting that AI agents may suffer from the same limitations as humans when reasoning about others. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, information aggregation remains unaffected by allowing cheap talk communication, changing the duration of the market or initial price, and strategic prompting-thus demonstrating that prediction markets are robust. We establish that "smarter" AI agents perform better at aggregation and they are more profitable. Surprisingly, giving them feedback about past performance makes them worse at aggregation and reduces their profits.

We study how AI agents form expectations and trade in experimental asset markets. Using a simulated open-call auction populated by autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, we document three main findings. First, AI agents exhibit classic behavioral patterns: a pronounced disposition effect and recency-weighted extrapolative beliefs. Second, these individual-level patterns aggregate into equilibrium dynamics that replicate classic experimental findings (Smith et al., 1988), including the predictive power of excess demand for future prices and the positive relationship between disagreement and trading volume. Third, by analyzing the agents' reasoning text through a twenty-mechanism scoring framework, we show that targeted prompt interventions causally amplify or suppress specific behavioral mechanisms, significantly altering the magnitude of market bubbles.

This paper provides a systematic comparison between Fitted Dynamic Programming (DP), where demand is estimated from data, and Reinforcement Learning (RL) methods in finite-horizon dynamic pricing problems. We analyze their performance across environments of increasing structural complexity, ranging from a single typology benchmark to multi-typology settings with heterogeneous demand and inter-temporal revenue constraints. Unlike simplified comparisons that restrict DP to low-dimensional settings, we apply dynamic programming in richer, multi-dimensional environments with multiple product types and constraints. We evaluate revenue performance, stability, constraint satisfaction behavior, and computational scaling, highlighting the trade-offs between explicit expectation-based optimization and trajectory-based learning.

We develop a high-precision classifier to measure artificial intelligence (AI) patents by fine-tuning PatentSBERTa on manually labeled data from the USPTO's AI Patent Dataset. Our classifier substantially improves the existing USPTO approach, achieving 97.0% precision, 91.3% recall, and a 94.0% F1 score, and it generalizes well to Chinese patents based on citation and lexical validation. Applying it to granted U.S. patents (1976-2023) and Chinese patents (2010-2023), we document rapid growth in AI patenting in both countries and broad convergence in AI patenting intensity and subfield composition, even as China surpasses the United States in recent annual patent counts. The organization of AI innovation nevertheless differs sharply: U.S. AI patenting is concentrated among large private incumbents and established hubs, whereas Chinese AI patenting is more geographically diffuse and institutionally diverse, with larger roles for universities and state-owned enterprises. For listed firms, AI patents command a robust market-value premium in both countries. Cross-border citations show continued technological interdependence rather than decoupling, with Chinese AI inventors relying more heavily on U.S. frontier knowledge than vice versa.

Society 5.0 and Industry 5.0 call for human-centric technology integration, yet the concept lacks an operational definition that can be measured, optimized, or evaluated at the firm level. This paper addresses three gaps. First, existing models of human-AI complementarity treat the augmentation function phi(D) as exogenous -- dependent only on the stock of AI deployed -- ignoring that two firms with identical technology investments achieve radically different augmentation outcomes depending on how the workplace is organized around the human-AI interaction. Second, no multi-dimensional instrument exists linking workplace design choices to augmentation productivity. Third, the Society 5.0 literature proposes human-centricity as a normative aspiration but provides no formal criterion for when it is economically optimal. We make four contributions. (1) We endogenize the augmentation function as phi(D, W), where W is a five-dimensional workplace design vector -- AI interface design, decision authority allocation, task orchestration, learning loop architecture, and psychosocial work environment -- and prove that human-centric design is profit-maximizing when the workforce's augmentable cognitive capital exceeds a critical threshold. (2) We conduct a PRISMA-guided systematic review of 120 papers (screened from 6,096 records) to map the evidence base for each dimension. (3) We provide secondary empirical evidence from Colombia's EDIT manufacturing survey (N=6,799 firms) showing that management practice quality amplifies the return to technology investment (interaction coefficient 0.304, p<0.01). (4) We propose the Workplace Augmentation Design Index (WADI), a 36-item theory-grounded instrument for diagnosing human-centricity at the firm level. Decision authority allocation emerges as the binding constraint for Society 5.0 transitions, and task orchestration as the most under-researched dimension

This paper develops a unified framework for evaluating the optimal degree of task automation. Moving beyond binary automate-or-not assessments, we model automation intensity as a continuous choice in which firms minimize costs by selecting an AI accuracy level, from no automation through partial human-AI collaboration to full automation. On the supply side, we estimate an AI production function via scaling-law experiments linking performance to data, compute, and model size. Because AI systems exhibit predictable but diminishing returns to these inputs, the cost of higher accuracy is convex: good performance may be inexpensive, but near-perfect accuracy is disproportionately costly. Full automation is therefore often not cost-minimizing; partial automation, where firms retain human workers for residual tasks, frequently emerges as the equilibrium. On the demand side, we introduce an entropy-based measure of task complexity that maps model accuracy into a labor substitution ratio, quantifying human labor displacement at each accuracy level. We calibrate the framework with O*NET task data, a survey of 3,778 domain experts, and GPT-4o-derived task decompositions, implementing it in computer vision. Task complexity shapes substitution: low-complexity tasks see high substitution, while high-complexity tasks favor limited partial automation. Scale of deployment is a key determinant: AI-as-a-Service and AI agents spread fixed costs across users, sharply expanding economically viable tasks. At the firm level, cost-effective automation captures approximately 11% of computer-vision-exposed labor compensation; under economy-wide deployment, this share rises sharply. Since other AI systems exhibit similar scaling-law economics, our mechanisms extend beyond computer vision, reinforcing that partial automation is often the economically rational long-run outcome, not merely a transitional phase.